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The unspoken side of mutual adjustment: Understanding intersubjective negotiation 
in small professional service firms 
Abstract 
Employment relationships and practices in small firms are generally acknowledged to 
be ad hoc, contested and negotiated, producinｪ けﾏ┌デ┌;ﾉ ;Sﾃ┌ゲデﾏWﾐデげ HWデ┘WWﾐ ﾗ┘ﾐWヴ-
managers and employees. Drawing on detailed qualitative empirical material from 
three small professional service firms, we argue that the explicit instances of formal or 
informal negotiation that influence mutual adjustment cannot be understood as 
discrete events disassociated from ongoing, everyday intersubjective negotiations. 
Mutual adjustment is founded in a largely unspoken, intersubjective guessing game 
that becomes particularly crucial in the ambiguity-intensive nature of small 
professional service firms where organizational realities are particularly prone to 
idiosyncratic (mis)interpretation. The intersubjective guesswork underlying mutual 
adjustment is potentially dysfunctional as outcomes arise that satisfy neither owner-
manager nor employee interests. We suggest that understanding employment 
relationships in small professional service firms requires greater focus on the study of 
ｷﾐSｷ┗ｷS┌;ﾉゲげ ヮWヴIWヮデｷﾗﾐゲ ;ﾐS デｴW ┘;┞ゲ ｷﾐ ┘ｴｷIｴ デｴWｷヴ ヴWﾉ;デｷ┗W ヮﾗゲｷデｷﾗﾐゲ ;ヴW ゲデヴ┌Iデ┌ヴed in 










Analysis of employment relationships in small firms has advanced beyond crude 
polarｷ┣;デｷﾗﾐゲ ﾗa けゲﾏ;ﾉﾉ ｷゲ HW;┌デｷa┌ﾉげ ﾗヴ けHﾉW;ﾆ ｴﾗ┌ゲWげ ヮWヴゲヮWIデｷ┗Wゲ ふ‘;ﾏ ;ﾐS ES┘;ヴSゲが 
2003) to recognize that relations between owner-managers and employees are the 
product of ongoing negotiations and processes of mutual adjustment (Holliday, 1995; 
Moule, 1998; Ram, 1994, 1999a). Mutual adjustment refers to the ways in which both 
owner-managers and their employees accommodate, adapt to and, potentially, 
struggle with one another to develop working practices and employment relationships. 
Importantly, this acknowlWSｪWゲ デｴ;デ Wﾏヮﾉﾗ┞WWゲ ;ヴW ﾐﾗデ けヮ;ゲゲｷ┗W ヴWIｷヮｷWﾐデゲ ﾗa 
ﾏ;ﾐ;ｪWﾏWﾐデ Iﾗﾐデヴﾗﾉげ ふ‘;ﾏ ;ﾐS ES┘;ヴSゲが ヲヰヰンぎ Αヲヲぶ H┌デ ;ヴW ｷﾐ┗ﾗﾉ┗WS ｷﾐ ﾗﾐｪﾗｷﾐｪ 
processes of (re)negotiation and adaptation. Small professional service firms (sPSFs) 
provide a valuable focus for this debate because of the high degrees of 
interdependency between dominant owner-managers and valuable specialist 
employees (Messersmith and Wales, 2011; Tam et al., 2002) that can potentially lead to 
greater degrees of mutual adjustment in their employment relationships (Ram, 1999a). 




While studies of small firms have distinguished between and examined the formal and 
informal nature of negotiation shaping employment relationships and working 
practices (Marlow et al., 2010) there has been limited exploration of the processes that 
may underlie (and potentially undermine) this negotiation. Utilizing detailed qualitative 
empirical material from three sPSFs, this paper develops the concept of mutual 
;Sﾃ┌ゲデﾏWﾐデ デﾗ ｴWﾉヮ ┌ﾐSWヴゲデ;ﾐS けデｴW ﾗaデWﾐ ﾗヮ;ケ┌W ;ﾐS IﾗﾏヮﾉW┝ ｷﾐデWヴﾐ;ﾉ S┞ﾐ;ﾏｷIゲげ 
ふ‘;ﾏ ;ﾐS ES┘;ヴSゲが ヲヰヰンぎ ΑヲΑぶ ﾗa ゲﾏ;ﾉﾉ aｷヴﾏゲげ Wﾏヮﾉﾗ┞ﾏWﾐデ ヴWﾉ;デｷﾗﾐゲｴｷヮゲく O┌ヴ aｷﾐSｷﾐｪゲ 
suggest that explicit instances of formal or informal negotiation cannot be understood 
as discrete events disassociated from ongoing, everyday, intersubjective forms of 
negotiation. These negotiations have important consequences for the organization as 
their development can become potentially dysfunctional and outcomes arise that 
satisfy neither owner-manager nor employee interests. 
Literature Review 
Employment relationships in small firms 
Regarded as informal adhocracies (Mintzberg, 1980), small firms are often considered 
to be dominated by the interests and goals of owner-managers. The same close 
physical proximity and interpersonal contact that breeds informality (Bacon and Hoque, 
2005; Ram and Edwards, 2003) can also increase opportunities for owner-managers to 
exert their influence (Jennings and Beaver, 1997). These close social-working 
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relationships allow some scope for employer and employee needs to be 
accommodated, for example employees may be granted flexibility around working-
hours in return for effort or task flexibility (Nadin and Cassell, 2007; Tsai et al., 2007), 
creating ongoing, everyday processes of negotiation. 
Tヴ;Sｷデｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ ヮﾗﾉ;ヴｷ┣;デｷﾗﾐゲ ﾗa けゲﾏ;ﾉﾉ ｷゲ HW;┌デｷa┌ﾉげ ﾗヴ けHﾉW;ﾆ ｴﾗ┌ゲWげ ;ヮヮヴﾗ;IｴWゲ デﾗ ゲﾏ;ﾉﾉ 
firms (Ram and Edwards, 2003) have been criticized for failing to pay sufficient 
attention to the way employment relationships might feature a combination of 
conjunctive and disjunctive interests (Marlow and Patton, 2002). This reflects a need 
for a more balanced, context-sensitive understanding of the nuances of employment 
relationships in small firms (Blackburn, 2005; Harney and Dundon, 2006). While 
external influences and sectoral factors interact with the internal firm environment to 
shape and potentially constrain employment relationships (Barrett, 1999; Barrett and 
Rainnie, 2002; Rainnie, 1989), they are not deterministic (Jansen et al., 2011). Those 
inside the organization must make sense of these factors and neither owner-managers 
nor their employees are passive in this interpretation (Arrowsmith et al., 2003; Gilman 
and Edwards, 2008; Ram, 1994). It is this negotiation of employment relationships 
within the firm that is the focus of the present study. 
The role of mutual adjustment 
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Laying emphasis on informal communication between actors, Mintzberg (1980) 
ヮヴﾗヮﾗゲWS けﾏ┌デ┌;ﾉ ;Sﾃ┌ゲデﾏWﾐデげ ;ゲ ; ヴWaﾉWIデｷﾗﾐ ﾗa デｴW Iﾗﾐデヴﾗﾉ ﾗa ┘orking practices by the 
けSﾗWヴゲげく WﾗヴﾆWヴゲ ｷﾐ ゲﾏ;ﾉﾉ aｷヴﾏゲ ;ヴW ﾐﾗデ ヮﾗ┘WヴﾉWゲゲ ｷﾐ デｴW a;IW ﾗa ﾏ;ﾐ;ｪWﾏWﾐデ ｷﾐデWヴWゲデゲ 
ふ‘;ﾏ ;ﾐS ES┘;ヴSゲが ヲヰヰンぶ H┌デ ﾏ;┞ Sヴ;┘ ﾗﾐ ┗;ヴｷﾗ┌ゲ ヴWゲﾗ┌ヴIWゲ デﾗ ;Iデｷ┗Wﾉ┞ けH;ヴｪ;ｷﾐげ ┘ｷデｴ 
their employers. Employment relationships and working practices in small firms are 
significantly influenced by such bargaining, of give and take between managers and 
employees. These ongoing, everyday interactions produce forms of mutual 
accommodation, adaptation and struggle (Holliday, 1995; Ram, 1994) and, as order is 
negotiated in an informal environment characterized by close spatial and social 
proximity, this is unlikely to derive solely from formalized management strategies 
(Nadin and Cassell, 2007; Ram, 1994; Verreynne et al., 2011). Mutual adjustment 
therefore suggests a more nuanced understanding of the informally negotiated 
working relationship of everyday organizational life (Ram, 1999b).  
Classic ethnographic studies of SMEs have highlighted the significance of this internal 
negotiation of social relations and the prominence of informality (Holliday, 1995; Ram, 
1994). Working practices and employment relationships in small firms are complex and 
heterogeneous (Rainnie, 1991) involving improvised, ad hoc solutions and 
compromises, producing particular, unwritten practices, routines and tacit 
understandings (Brown, et al., 2010; Ram et al., 2001). These processes of informal 
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negotiation produce forms of mutual adjustment (Goffee and Scase, 1995; Ram, 1999a) 
that we suggest can be particularly heightened in sPSFs. 
The distinctive case of small PSFs 
We suggest that sPSFs represent a potentially fruitful avenue for investigating forms of 
employer-employee negotiation. Whilst retaining many of the features of small firms, 
for example around close physical and social proximity and informality, sPSFs also 
exhibit many of the distinct features associated with larger PSFs. For example, the 
influential position of highly-skilled or specialist employees who work closely with 
clients can be central to the success of these organizations, granting them a relatively 
strong position from which to negotiate their employment relationships and exert 
influence on the development and growth of the firm (Behrends, 2007; Ram, 1999a, 
1999b). Employment relationships in sPSFs are therefoヴW Iｴ;ヴ;IデWヴｷ┣WS H┞ けデｴW 
necessity of balancing the pressures for organizational efficiency with the need to 
harness the entrepreneurial facilities of key staff [which] tends towards more 
IﾗﾐデｷﾐｪWﾐデ ;ﾐS aﾉ┌ｷS ;ヮヮヴﾗ;IｴWゲ デﾗ ﾉ;Hﾗ┌ヴげ ふ‘;ﾏが ヱΓΓΓ;ぎ ヲΒぶく  
Employment practices can be used to moderate these relationships (Boxall and 
Steeneveld, 1999; Tam et al., 2002) and more sophisticated practices have been 
identified in specialist small firms than in other SMEs (Brown et al., 2010; Dietz et al., 
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2006). However, with room for worker discretion and a potential lack of managerial 
expertise, there remains a need for consent to be negotiated (Ram, 1994, 1999b). The 
negotiation of employment relationships and working practices in sPSFs is therefore 
characterized by the interdependence and potential conflict between central owner-
managers and valuable, influential specialist workers. It is this ongoing, everyday 
negotiation that produces potentially distinctive forms of mutual adjustment. However, 
the development of working practices and employment relationships in sPSFs and 
other small, knowledge-intensive organizations remain relatively under-researched, 
despite their importance for many economies (Ram and Edwards, 2010). 
Mutual adjustment and intersubjectivity 
In the small firm context, the importance of mutual adjustment is developed from a 
perspective on the negotiated order that reflects the relative importance of factors 
such as external environment and individual characteristics as well as both formal and 
informal negotiations (Ram, 1994: 5). We suggest that there is a further, internally held 
influence of individual (mis)perceptions that underlies (and potentially undermines) 
this negotiated order and the mutual adjustment that reflects it. Recent discussions of 
employment relationships in small firms have focused on forms of informality but not 
on the unspoken influences that determine forms of accommodation and adaptation. 
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We suggest the relevance of intersubjectivity as a useful conception for informal, 
(partially) unacknowledged forms of negotiation in small firms. 
Intersubjectivity is derived from the particularly interactional infrastructure of 
organizations in which individuals seek to understand others, to make themselves 
understood and to hold one another accountable for these understandings (Reich, 
2010). It has therefore been suggested as useful for understanding organizational life 
(Eden et al., 1981) and management, as a mediating influence in these processes of 
mutual understanding and interpretation (Hancock and Tyler, 2001). It is in asserting a 
ヮWヴIWヮデｷﾗﾐ ﾗa ﾗデｴWヴゲ デｴ;デ ﾗﾐW デ;ﾆWゲ ┌ヮ ; ヮﾗゲｷデｷﾗﾐ ;ﾐS ;ﾐ ｷSWﾐデｷデ┞ ﾗa ﾗﾐWげゲ ﾗ┘ﾐ ;ﾐS 
intersubjectivity therefore provides a means of understanding how individuals 
(differently) construe power and predict the behaviour of powerful others, their values 
and intentions (Jones, 1984). It is in this unchoreographed dance of interpretation and 
prediction that norms can develop in work groups (Eden et al., 1981) and that non-
vocal coordination of organizational environments and practices can take place 
(Schegloff, 1992). We propose that this type of mutual recognition is an important 
factor underlying the processes of mutual adjustment in small firms. 
In particular, while studies of small firms have examined the informal nature of 
negotiation shaping employment relationships (Holliday, 1995) there has been limited 
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attention given to illuminating other ways in which employment relationships and 
working practices might develop. The potential role of intersubjectivity in these distinct 
contexts has yet to be explored. However, the reliance of owner-managers on their 
personal assessments (Nooteboom, 1988), discussions of tacit understanding and 
knowledge management (Edwards, 2007; Edwards et al., 2007; Yu, 2009) and the role 
of individual subjectivity in relational development (Jayasinghe et al., 2008) have 
ゲ┌ｪｪWゲデWS ゲﾗﾏWデｴｷﾐｪ ﾗa デｴW ｷSW;げゲ ヴWﾉW┗;ﾐIWく IﾐデWヴゲ┌HﾃWIデｷ┗ｷデ┞ ｴ;ゲ ;ﾉゲﾗ ;ﾉﾉﾗ┘WS “ｴ;ヴｷaｷ 
and Zhang (2009) to draw out the relative unimportance of truth in the negotiation of 
organizational definitions, broadly in line with considerations of SMEs as shared 
communities of meaning (Rigg, 2005). 
Our paper sets out to explore the ways in which ongoing, everyday negotiations may 
manifest in sPSFs with a view to developing our understanding of the processes 
underlying mutual adjustment. We will discuss our research findings in terms of the 
potential tensions between central, dominant owner-managers and influential 
specialist workers and how the processes underlying mutual adjustment cope with and 
accommodate these tensions on an everyday basis. Intersubjective negotiation is then 
discussed in relation to mutual adjustment and its impact in sPSFs. We will first 




Our study was focused on investigating working practices and employment 
relationships in sPSFs. Our qualitative multiple case-study research strategy (Yin, 2003) 
enabled us to explore the relatively informal yet routine-based environments of SMEs 
(Scott et al., 1989) and understand employment practices and relationships in action. 
Getting close to the practice of employment relationships in SMEs reveals subtleties of 
employment relationships (Holliday, 1995; Ram, 1994) and in our study we became 
interested in the processes underlying mutual adjustment. 
Three sPSFs were recruited as separate cases via purposive sampling. The firms, with 
fewer than 50 employees, were small (BERR, 2006) and corresponded to Morris and 
Eﾏヮゲﾗﾐげゲ ふヱΓΓΒぎ ヶヱヰぶ SWaｷﾐｷデｷﾗﾐ ﾗa P“Fゲ ;ゲ ﾗヴｪ;ﾐｷ┣;デions trading on the ability of their 
human capital to create bespoke, intangible solutions to complex client problems. 
Despite each firm possessing relatively sophisticated formal policies, for example 
evidenced by their attainment of such external recognition as Investors in People 
accreditation, elements of their practices were conducted informally (Marlow et al., 
2010), not least owing to the intangible nature of the service work undertaken.  
TｴW ﾗヴｪ;ﾐｷ┣;デｷﾗﾐゲ ヮヴﾗ┗ｷSWS ゲヮWIｷ;ﾉｷゲデ ヴWIヴ┌ｷデﾏWﾐデ ふけ“Iｷ‘WIげが ; scientific industry 
ヴWIヴ┌ｷデﾏWﾐデ aｷヴﾏ ;ﾐS けFｷﾐ‘WIげが ; aｷﾐ;ﾐIｷ;ﾉ ゲWヴ┗ｷIWゲ ヴWIヴ┌ｷデﾏWﾐデ aｷヴﾏぶ ;ﾐS SWゲｷｪﾐ-
12 
 
Iﾗﾏﾏ┌ﾐｷI;デｷﾗﾐゲ ふけCﾗﾏCﾗげが ; Iﾗﾏﾏ┌ﾐｷI;デｷﾗﾐゲ Iﾗﾐゲ┌ﾉデ;ﾐI┞ぶ ゲWヴ┗ｷIWゲく Aﾉﾉ デｴヴWW aｷヴﾏゲ 
operated as niche service providers to small numbers of clients and identified 
themselves as offering bespoke, specialist services that could be clearly distinguished 
aヴﾗﾏ ﾏﾗヴW Iﾗﾏﾏﾗﾐ けｴｷｪｴ-ゲデヴWWデげ ヮヴﾗ┗ｷSWヴゲく T┞ヮｷI;ﾉﾉ┞ ;ﾉﾉ ｴ;S ﾉﾗ┘ デ┌ヴﾐﾗ┗Wヴ ヴ;デWゲが 
reflecting owner-ﾏ;ﾐ;ｪWヴゲげ IﾗﾐIWヮデｷﾗﾐ ﾗa デｴW ┗;ﾉ┌WSが ｴｷｪｴﾉ┞ ゲﾆｷﾉﾉWS ﾐ;デ┌ヴW ﾗa デｴWｷr 
employees. As well as the centrality of specialist work, the three firms had sufficient 
commonalities, such as owner-managers who had left large corporate environments to 
pursue similar work through their own businesses and a reliance on narrow client 
bases, to allow meaningful comparisons to be drawn between their employment 
relationships and working practices despite their different sectors. The firms were 
given pseudonyms to anonymize their identity. 
Gathering empirical material 
Detailed qualitative research was conducted in each company over an 18-month period 
H┞ デｴW ヮ;ヮWヴげゲ aｷヴゲデ ;┌デｴﾗヴく Tｴｷゲ IﾗﾏヮヴｷゲWS ;ﾐ ｷﾐｷデｷ;ﾉ ﾗﾐ-site phase (phase one) at the 
company premises followed by telephone, email and some personal contact during an 
intervening period before a second significant phase on-site (phase two). In total the 
empirical material comprised on-site observations (348 hours), semi-structured 
interviews (x35) and company documentation (600 pages; see Appendix Table 1). The 
three sources of empirical material facilitated triangulation and built understanding to 
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inform the ongoing study (Denzin, 1970; Webb, 1970). Further, observations helped to 
gain a sense of the day-to-day practices in each firm and attending team meetings, 
coffee breaks and other events provided a sense of context while developing rapport 
between researcher and participants (Alvesson, 2011a). This informal interaction was 
supported by access to a broad range of documents such as employment contracts, 
values statements, general staff emails and other notices. 
Care was taken to interview people across each firm to gain a rounded understanding 
of working lives. The semi-structured interviews typically lasted around 60 minutes, 
with a range between 35 and 105 minutes, often depending on the parデｷIｷヮ;ﾐデゲげ 
individual approaches to the process. All interviews were structured around topics 
including recruitment and selection, training, reward and recognition, performance 
appraisal and staff exit. These initial questions then allowed participants to relate their 
own explanations of employment relationships and working practices, descriptions that 
were subsequently pursued by the interviewer. Verbatim interview transcripts were 
produced in their entirety for phase one and for relevant sections in phase two to 





Drawing too-sharp a distinction between collection and analysis of qualitative empirical 
material can hinder the depth of a research study by closing-off lines of enquiry arising 
from emerging ideas and reflections (Eisenhardt, 1989; Glaser and Strauss, 1967). In 
light of this, interview tapes were listened to within 24 hours of the recording for points 
of interest or that required elaboration. Subsequent, close readings of the empirical 
material, conducted by both authors, informed ongoing discussions to develop a rich 
understanding of the organizations.  
Initial reviews of the empirical material collected suggested that employment 
relationships comprised negotiations on many topics and in different modes. We 
ﾗヴｪ;ﾐｷ┣WS ﾗ┌ヴ WﾏヮｷヴｷI;ﾉ ﾏ;デWヴｷ;ﾉ H┞ IﾗSｷﾐｪ ｷﾐゲデ;ﾐIWゲ ｷﾐ ┘ｴｷIｴ ﾗﾐW ヮ;ヴデ┞げゲ ｷﾐデWヴWゲデゲ 
┘WヴW ふﾗヴ ┘WヴW ヮWヴIWｷ┗WS H┞ デｴWﾏ デﾗ HWぶ ｷﾐ ﾐWｪﾗデｷ;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗヴ デWﾐゲｷﾗﾐ ┘ｷデｴ ;ﾐﾗデｴWヴ ヮ;ヴデ┞げゲく 
We ordered these according to the area of employment relationship in which it 
ﾗII┌ヴヴWSが aﾗヴ W┝;ﾏヮﾉW けゲ;ﾉ;ヴ┞ ゲWデデｷﾐｪ ;ﾐS ヴW┗ｷW┘げく Fﾗヴ W;Iｴ ｷﾐゲデ;ﾐIWが ┘W ﾐﾗデWS デｴW 
positions of the relevant parties and briefly described how the matter was resolved. 
Further, we were careful to draw on the longitudinal nature of our study and trace 
changing perceptions of negotiation around issues such as payment structures that 
persisted throughout the study. Given the emergent nature of our codes, no formal 
testing was completed for agreement between the authors but a coding dictionary was 
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developed and discussed, disagreements being resolved by recourse to the empirical 
material. 
The codes and relevant extracts of empirical material were analysed in light of existing 
literature on employment relationships and working practices in small firms and the 
nature of influence exerted by specialist employees, requiring frequent returns to the 
original empirical material as we explored the concepts developed. The negotiations 
identified were observed to take very different forms. Some issues were resolved 
through a formal negotiation such as using a pay review meeting to discuss an 
Wﾏヮﾉﾗ┞WWげゲ ゲ;ﾉ;ヴ┞ ﾉW┗Wﾉ ┘ｴｷﾉW ﾗデｴWヴ ｷゲゲ┌Wゲ ┘WヴW ;SSヴWゲゲWS デｴヴﾗ┌ｪｴ ｷﾐaﾗヴﾏ;ﾉ 
negotiations, such as reminding staff of appropriate conduct towards colleagues in the 
office. These formal and informal explicit negotiations fitted with our existing 
understandings of mutual adjustment but there were other instances that departed 
from established literature. These were occasions in which research participants 
described changes being made in response to perceived, but as yet unrealised, 
pressures within the organization. In other words, while there was no apparent explicit 
negotiation, parties were altering their position in respect of another as if engaged in 
an active negotiation. As these instances emerged from our findings, we were 
ヮヴﾗﾏヮデWS デﾗ IﾗﾐゲｷSWヴ ｴﾗ┘ デｴWゲW ┌ﾐゲヮﾗﾆWﾐ けﾐWｪﾗデｷ;デｷﾗﾐゲげ ｷﾐaﾗヴﾏWS デｴW Wﾏヮﾉﾗ┞ﾏWﾐデ 




In this section we will describe the dynamics of the mutual adjustment of employment 
relationships and working practices in each firm and discuss specific examples in detail. 
This is principally to suggest the unspoken, anticipatory processes underlying mutual 
adjustment that are not adequately accounted for or addressed in the existing 
literature. Our findings are presented on a firm-by-firm basis to allow for a detailed 
description of the context and (potential) relationships between different areas of 
negotiation, acknowledging that types of negotiation, for example in terms of relative 
degrees of informality, are not mutually exclusive (Marlow, et al., 2010). 
All three firms sought to grow and increase the degree of formality in their 
employment relationships and business processes (Gilman and Edwards, 2008). 
Existing employment relationships, contrary to observations in larger PSFs, had 
features in common with adhocratic, informal small firms governed by powerful, 
central owner-managers. However, the characterization of specialist workers as 
important to the organizations was also common to all three firms. 
ComCo 
ComCo Limited is a broad-based communications consultancy offering public relations 
(PR), strategic marketing, design and internal communications services. ComCo was 
17 
 
incorporated in 2001, almost four years prior to the first research visit. The three 
founding directors, Patrick, Roger and Steve, had previously worked at the same large 
Iﾗﾏヮ;ﾐ┞ ;ﾐS ┘WヴW ﾉ;デWヴ ﾃﾗｷﾐWS H┞ ESSｷWが ﾗﾐW ﾗa ‘ﾗｪWヴげゲ aﾗヴﾏWヴ IﾗﾉﾉW;ｪ┌Wゲが ┘ｴﾗ 
became a junior director alongside Steve. Including the hands-on directors, the 
business employs 14 people, divided between PR/communications professionals (x6), 
the growing design team (x5) and a small sales team (x3). Although initially focused on 
providing these services to SMEs and public sector organizations, as part of its growth 
strategy ComCo later attracted more lucrative and demanding private-sector clients. 
TｴW H┌ゲｷﾐWゲゲ ;ﾉゲﾗ Iｴ;ﾐｪWS ｷﾐ ﾗデｴWヴ ┘;┞ゲ S┌ヴｷﾐｪ デｴW ゲデ┌S┞が ｷﾐIﾉ┌Sｷﾐｪ P;デヴｷIﾆげゲ W┝ｷデ ;ﾐS 
Roger taking a majority stake, increasing his already significant influence across the 
firm. 
TｴW ﾐ;デ┌ヴW ﾗa ﾏ┌デ┌;ﾉ ;Sﾃ┌ゲデﾏWﾐデ ;デ CﾗﾏCﾗ IﾗﾏHｷﾐWS aﾗヴﾏ;ﾉが ｷﾐaﾗヴﾏ;ﾉ ;ﾐS け┌ﾐゲヮﾗﾆWﾐげ 
forms of negotiation as well as resistance. A central force in the everyday working 
relations is derived from Roger informally asserting control, not only on the employees 
but also his fellow directors. He is the centre of the office (and the organization) with 
most PR work going through him. When out of the office Roger maintains his centrality, 
making regular calls throughout the day for short briefings and follow-ups.  
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AIIﾗﾏﾏﾗS;デｷﾗﾐ ;ﾐS ;S;ヮデ;デｷﾗﾐ ｷﾐ ヮヴ;IデｷIWゲ ｷゲ ｷﾉﾉ┌ゲデヴ;デWS ｷﾐ デｴW I;ゲW ﾗa Iﾗﾐゲ┌ﾉデ;ﾐデゲげ 
pay. WｴWﾐ L;┌ヴ; ﾃﾗｷﾐWS CﾗﾏCﾗ ゲｴW ┘;ゲ ヮ;ｷS ┘ｴ;デ P;デヴｷIﾆ ;SﾏｷデデWS ┘;ゲ ; け┗Wヴ┞ ﾉﾗ┘げ 
wage but with a contractual promise to review the amount after three and six months. 
Laura reported that the company had honoured these formal pay reviews. However, 
while Patrick fretted about her starting salary, Laura explained, independently, how she 
was happy with her initial rate of pay since she had offered to work for free in order to 
make her first step on the ladder. The formal pay reviews were held, thereafter, on an 
annual basis but the directors also awarded ad hoc bonuses for exceptional client work. 
This reflected P;デヴｷIﾆげゲ IﾗﾐIWヴﾐ デｴ;デ CﾗﾏCﾗ ヮ;┞ IﾗﾏヮWデｷデｷ┗W ゲ;ﾉ;ヴｷWゲ デﾗ ヴWデ;ｷﾐ ﾆW┞ ゲデ;aaが 
who were seen as having vital client relationships that would be difficult to replace: 
WW ┘;ﾐデ デﾗ ﾆWWヮ ヮWﾗヮﾉW HWI;┌ゲW ｷデげゲ ゲ┌Iｴ ; ヴWﾉ;デｷﾗﾐゲｴｷヮ-based business. If you 
were to lose them you are in danger of losing the client because the client likes 
to see that person. 
As with Laura, this led to staff receiving pay increases and promotions outside of the 
formal pay review process. These increases were not only informal, they were neither 
sought nor initially anticipated by the staff. Laura, after developing a burgeoning local 
reputation for her work, related her experience: 
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We had the team meeting in January and we were going through all the 
accounts and all the Private Sector ones [had] my name on them, and I think I 
must have looked, been a bit freaked out! Patrick took me outside and said, 
さOｴが ┞ﾗ┌ ﾆﾐﾗ┘が ┘W ┘WヴW ｪﾗｷﾐｪ デﾗ ｪｷ┗W ┞ﾗ┌ ; ヮ;┞ ヴｷゲWざ ;ﾐS ﾗaaｷIｷ;ﾉﾉ┞ぐ ;ﾐS デｴWﾐ 
gave me a letter and it was all in, in there, it had been decided. 
However, this strategy was acknowledged to increase pressure on the business to 
generate profit in order to afford the salaries. Whilst the perceived consequences of 
losing skilled staff left the owners feeling that they had had little choice, concerns over 
affordability remained and Patrick feared that ComCo could lose staff as a result of 
limited pay increases in the future, despite no evidence that staff considered leaving or 
required higher salaries. The importance of established relationships and the bespoke 
nature of the work left the owner-managers unable to identify how to recruit or 
replace such staff. 
This deep belief in the value of their most effective staff members left the owner-
managers feeling constrained in some of the areas of the business, extending beyond 
pay and rewards. This was most dramatically demonstrated when, while working at a 
IﾉｷWﾐデげゲ ﾗaaｷIWゲが デ┘ﾗ ゲWﾐｷﾗヴ ゲヮWIｷ;ﾉｷゲデゲ Iﾗﾐデヴ;┗WﾐWS デｴW IﾉｷWﾐデげゲ Wﾏ;ｷﾉ ヮﾗﾉｷI┞が I;┌ゲｷﾐｪ 
ｪヴW;デ WﾏH;ヴヴ;ゲゲﾏWﾐデ aﾗヴ CﾗﾏCﾗげゲ SｷヴWIデﾗヴゲ ┘ｴﾗ ┘WヴW ┘Wﾉﾉ-known in that sector. Under 
20 
 
CﾗﾏCﾗげゲ SｷゲIｷヮﾉｷﾐ;ヴ┞ ヮﾗﾉｷI┞ Aﾉｷゲﾗﾐ ;ﾐS Cｴヴｷゲデｷﾐ; Iﾗ┌ﾉS ｴ;┗W HWWﾐ SｷゲﾏｷゲゲWSが ゲﾗﾏWデｴｷﾐｪ 
Roger was initially determined to do, as much to restore his reputation with the clients 
as to signal that such behaviour in ComCo was unacceptable.  
However, Roger and Patrick also recognized that ComCo must still deliver the client 
contract and that Alison and Christina were central to this. Neither Alison nor Christina 
campaigned to keep their jobs, yet the owner-managers felt compelled to acquiesce to 
their unspoken interests for fear of jeopardising the project and future work in this 
important sector. Although the option of dismissal was discussed between the owner-
managers, no formal or informal direct negotiation took place and the matter was 
quietly dropped. It seemed as though the owner-ﾏ;ﾐ;ｪWヴゲげ ヮWヴIWヮデｷﾗﾐ ﾗa ゲヮWIｷ;ﾉｷゲデ 
Wﾏヮﾉﾗ┞WWゲげ ┗;ﾉ┌W Wﾐゲ┌ヴWS デｴ;デ デｴWｷヴ ｷﾐデWヴWゲデゲ ┘WヴW ヴWヮヴWゲWﾐデWS ｷﾐ ﾏ;ﾐ;ｪWﾏWﾐデ 
discussions, in this case superseding company policy and the owner-ﾏ;ﾐ;ｪWヴゲげ 
immediate personal interests. 
SciRec 
SciRec Limited specializes in recruiting staff for scientific industries, providing 
associated services such as psychometric testing and interview training. The managing 
director, Alex, had taken voluntary redundancy from his senior recruitment role at a 
major pharmaceutical company and founded the firm in early 2001, three years before 
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the first research visit. He is the sole owner. SciRec serves a small number of clients 
across Britain on a contractual basis rather than replicating the more highly sales-
Sヴｷ┗Wﾐ aﾗヴﾏ ﾗa けｴｷｪｴ-ゲデヴWWデげ ヴWIヴ┌ｷデﾏWﾐデ ;ｪWﾐIｷWゲく “Wヴ┗ｷIWゲ ;ヴW H;ゲWS ;ヴﾗ┌ﾐS ; SWデ;ｷﾉWS 
┌ﾐSWヴゲデ;ﾐSｷﾐｪ ﾗa IﾉｷWﾐデゲげ H┌ゲｷﾐWゲゲWゲ ;ﾐS ゲデヴﾗﾐｪ ヴWﾉ;デｷﾗﾐゲｴｷヮゲ ┘ｷデｴ デｴW SWヮ;ヴデﾏWﾐデ;ﾉ 
ﾏ;ﾐ;ｪWヴゲ aﾗヴ ┘ｴﾗﾏ デｴW ゲWヴ┗ｷIWゲ ;ヴW デ;ｷﾉﾗヴWS H┞ “Iｷ‘WIげゲ Iﾗﾐゲ┌ﾉデ;ﾐデゲく TｴWヴW ┘ere two 
consultants at the start of the study and three at its conclusion. 
M;ﾐ;ｪｷﾐｪ SｷヴWIデﾗヴ AﾉW┝げゲ ヴWﾉ;デｷﾗﾐゲ ┘ｷデｴ ゲデ;aa ┘WヴW Iｴ;ヴ;IデWヴｷ┣WS H┞ ｴｷゲ Sｷゲゲ;デｷゲa;Iデｷﾗﾐ 
and continual attempts to cajole consultants into line. Such frustrations were tempered 
by his nervousness around staff turnover. TｴW W┝デWﾐデ ﾗa Iﾗﾐゲ┌ﾉデ;ﾐデゲげ ヮﾗ┘Wヴ ゲデWﾏゲ aヴﾗﾏ 
デｴW Iﾗﾏヮ;ﾐ┞げゲ ヴWﾉｷ;ﾐIW ﾐﾗデ ﾗﾐﾉ┞ ﾗﾐ デｴWｷヴ ;HｷﾉｷデｷWゲ デﾗ ;ゲゲWゲゲ ;ヮヮﾉｷI;ﾐデゲげ デWIｴﾐｷI;ﾉ ゲﾆｷﾉﾉ 
and suitability for a given role, but also upon the relationships they develop with 
managers at client firms. In common with the other participant firms, employees with 
high levels of performance were seen as particularly difficult to recruit, irrespective of 
qualifications or experience. This led Alex to offer these top performers additional 
benefits such as externally-provided training courses in order to pre-empt any intention 
to leave, despite no such intentions being indicated. 
Cﾗﾐゲ┌ﾉデ;ﾐデゲげ Hﾗ┌ﾐS;ヴ┞-testing appeared a common feature of mutual adjustment at 
SciRec and this gradual, contested adaptation could continue over long periods of time. 
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During the first research phase there was an intricate combination of contingent pay 
arrangements. Alex described these schemes as a reward and an incentive for filling 
client vacancies that earned revenue for the firm. However, the consultants perceived 
inequity in the system because, under its complex rules, certain vacancies attracted 
commission while other, similar ones did not. As Kathy, a consultant, explained: 
Iげﾏ ﾐﾗデ ゲ┌ヮヮﾗゲWS デﾗ Iﾉ;ｷﾏ aﾗヴ デｴ;t [type of vacancy], but I think people claim for 
it anyway? (Researcher: People being?) Erm, me and [colleague] (laugh). 
Because, you know, we [SciRec] make less of a fee on people coming through 
the [client] website but our argument is that we do exactly the same for those 
candidates as we do for others... 
In this way, the consultants were attempting to extend the scope of their financial 
ヴW┘;ヴSゲく AﾉW┝ ;ヮヮW;ヴWS IﾗﾏヮﾉｷIｷデ ｷﾐ デｴｷゲ けIｴW;デｷﾐｪげ H┞ ゲｷｪﾐｷﾐｪ ﾗaa デｴWゲW Iﾗﾏﾏｷゲゲｷﾗﾐ 
claims while company performance was on target, effectively accepting their implicit 
demands for increased remuneration. In doing so, Alex undermined his own carefully 
prepared commission system that had been developed to reward and focus those 
activities he deemed most important to SciRecげゲ ﾉﾗﾐｪ-term success. The consultants 
adjusted accordingly, assessing their commission rates (and related work) in terms of 
what Alex was willing to sign-off rather than the formal policy. This mutually adjusted 
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practice therefore came about through an unacknowledged process of negotiation in 
which the consultants submitted adjusted claims and gradually established what would 
and would not be accepted. 
CﾗﾐIWヴﾐWS ;デ デｴW Iﾗﾏヮ;ﾐ┞げゲ SWIﾉｷﾐｷﾐｪ ヮWヴaﾗヴﾏ;ﾐIW ;ｪ;ｷﾐゲデ IﾉｷWﾐデ ゲWヴ┗ｷIW ﾉW┗Wﾉ 
agreements, yet still paying out commission for placements, Alex again became 
frustrated with his employees. He eventually opted to completely overhaul the 
commission scheme. Working over the Christmas holiday, with only limited input from 
Sharon (operations manager), Alex redesigned the scheme explicitly in line with his 
current goals. The changes increased emphasis on client satisfaction and, while winning 
new business would attract a higher rate of commission, filling vacancies at existing 
IﾉｷWﾐデゲ ふけゲｴﾗﾗデｷﾐｪ aｷゲｴ ｷﾐ ; H;ヴヴWﾉげ に Sharon) would attract reduced rates. Acting in this 
unilateral fashion, Alex operated as a dominant owner-manager, exercising his 
apparent right to run his business as he saw fit. There was neither engagement with 
staff nor explicit acknowledgement of the ways in which the system had previously 
adapted, and what employee beliefs and goals these adaptations had reflected. 
The consultants learned of the change at a meeting called to announce its 
implementation. As Sharon recalled, initial reactions were not positive: 
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Well, Kathy cried. (INT: Cried?) Yes, she actually excused herself [from the 
meeting] and cried in the office. Erm, Lucy got mad...anyway, she was off sick all 
the time. 
Aﾉデｴﾗ┌ｪｴ デｴW Iｴ;ﾐｪWゲ ﾏｷｪｴデ ヴWS┌IW Iﾗﾐゲ┌ﾉデ;ﾐデゲげ W;ヴﾐｷﾐｪゲが ヮWヴaﾗヴﾏ;ﾐIW-related 
rewards were provided for the results Alex required. However, the consultants focused 
on those changes that they argued would cost them hundreds of pounds each month 
in lost commission. Three weeks after the announcement Alex described the 
;デﾏﾗゲヮｴWヴW ;ゲ け; Hｷデ aヴﾗゲデ┞ デｴW ゲﾐﾗ┘ﾏ;ﾐげ ;ﾐSが ┘ｷデｴｷﾐ ; Iﾗ┌ヮﾉW ﾗa ﾏﾗﾐデｴゲが ｴｷゲ Iｴ;ﾐｪWゲ 
had been quietly dropped. In redesigning the pay system Alex failed to acknowledge 
the potential power held by the consultants at the heart of his business. By assuming 
that, as owner, he had prerogative to unilaterally set pay and commission rates while 
ﾐﾗデ ;IIﾗ┌ﾐデｷﾐｪ aﾗヴ Iﾗﾐゲ┌ﾉデ;ﾐデゲげ ｷﾐデWヴWゲデゲが AﾉW┝ WaaWIデｷ┗Wﾉ┞ ヴWケ┌ｷヴWS デｴW Iﾗﾐゲ┌ﾉデ;ﾐデゲ デﾗ 
explicitly assert themselves in resisting the changes.  
The previous system that had gradually been adapted through an implicit process of 
mutual adjustment was therefore reinstated after a prolonged campaign of informal, 
small scale resistance from the consultants. However, when the resistant consultants 
eventually left the firm through unrelated causes, Alex found that, contrary to his 
previous fears, replacing them was relatively easy and caused minimal disruption with 
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デｴW aｷヴﾏげゲ ﾏ;ﾃﾗヴ IﾉｷWﾐデく HW デｴWヴWaﾗヴW aWﾉデ IﾗﾐaｷSWﾐデ ｷﾐ ヴWｷﾐデヴﾗS┌Iｷﾐｪ デｴW ヴW┘;ヴS ゲIｴWﾏW 
he had previously been forced to abandon. New employees, seeking to impress Alex 
and not having implicitly negotiated unacknowledged increases in their commission 
claims, expressed little resistance and accepted the scheme without incident. 
FinRec 
FinRec Limited specializes in the recruitment of permanent staff to the largest 
operators in the financial services and consumer credit industry. It was founded in 1994 
by owner-manager Paul who had worked in retail finance and was still involved in this 
ｷﾐS┌ゲデヴ┞ ┗ｷ; ; ゲWヮ;ヴ;デW H┌ゲｷﾐWゲゲ ┗Wﾐデ┌ヴWく Fｷﾐ‘WIげゲ IﾉｷWﾐデゲ have outlets nationwide and 
undertake regular recruitment activities. The precise nature of the service provided 
depends on client requirements but can involve recruiting individuals or hiring an 
entire team. While serving national companies, selection decisions depend upon 
Iﾗﾐゲ┌ﾉデ;ﾐデゲげ ┌ﾐSWヴゲデ;ﾐSｷﾐｪ ﾗa ｷﾐSｷ┗ｷS┌;ﾉ ﾏ;ﾐ;ｪWヴゲげ ヴWケ┌ｷヴWﾏWﾐデゲ ;ﾐS ヮヴWaWヴWﾐIWゲ aﾗヴ 
デｴW ゲ┌IIWゲゲa┌ﾉ ヮﾉ;IWﾏWﾐデ ﾗa I;ﾐSｷS;デWゲく Tﾗ ゲ┌IIWWSが Fｷﾐ‘WIげゲ ﾐｷﾐW Iﾗﾐゲ┌ﾉデ;ﾐデゲ ﾏ┌ゲデ 
have an appreciation of the job markets local to their client outlet, local rates of pay 
and also the style of the existing team so that candidates complement those staff 
already in post. 
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Fｷﾐ‘WI ｴ;ゲ ; ゲデヴﾗﾐｪ Wﾏヮｴ;ゲｷゲ ﾗﾐ ﾏWWデｷﾐｪ ヮWヴゲﾗﾐ;ﾉ デ;ヴｪWデゲが ｷﾐIﾉ┌Sｷﾐｪ ｪWﾐデﾉW けヮWWヴ 
ヮヴWゲゲ┌ヴWげが ヴWIﾗヴSｷﾐｪ ｷﾐSｷ┗ｷS┌;ﾉ ヮヴﾗｪヴWゲゲ ｷﾐ ﾏWWデｷﾐｪゲ ;ﾐS on notice-boards. In addition 
to the formal commission structure there are regular activities in which performance is 
rewarded with alcohol, reinforcing a work hard/play hard culture. The highly 
competitive nature of the firm was suggested by an occasion, now part of FinRec 
folklore, when Norma (the operations manager) had to intervene in a competition over 
bottles of spirits that led to heated rows in the office. 
Reviewing performance and rewards at FinRec, owner-manager Paul and operations 
manager Norma realized that, while team managers were being paid a higher salary to 
manage team performance in addition to their consultant roles, this premium was 
┌ﾐヴWﾉ;デWS デﾗ デｴWｷヴ ヴWゲヮWIデｷ┗W デW;ﾏゲげ ヴWゲ┌ﾉデゲく TｴW┞ ┘;ﾐデWS デﾗ IヴW;デW ; ﾉｷﾐﾆ HWデ┘WWﾐ 
team performance and teaﾏ ﾏ;ﾐ;ｪWヴゲげ ヴW┘;ヴSゲく Iﾐ IﾗﾐゲｷSWヴｷﾐｪ ｴﾗ┘ デﾗ ヴWゲﾗﾉ┗W ゲ┌Iｴ ; 
sensitive matter, Norma explained their approach: 
Paul will come up with various options, but I will actually then challenge him, 
;ﾐS I ;ﾉ┘;┞ゲ ゲ;┞ さ‘ｷｪｴデが ｷa I ┘;ゲ J;ﾐWが ﾗヴ ｷa I ┘;ゲ Dｷ;ﾐWが I ┘ﾗ┌ﾉSﾐげt be happy with 
デｴ;デ HWI;┌ゲW Xが Yが ;ﾐS )ざくくく“ﾗ ┘W デWﾐS デﾗ Sﾗ ｷデ HWデ┘WWﾐ ┌ゲ ;ﾐS デｴWﾐ ┘ｴWﾐ ┘W 
came up with the one we finally, hopefully is going to work 
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In this instance a decision was made to create an additional team and focus team 
ﾏ;ﾐ;ｪWヴゲげ Hﾗﾐ┌ゲWゲ ﾏﾗヴW closely on the performance of their team: 
I ゲ;ｷSが ┘Wﾉﾉ I デｴｷﾐﾆ デｴ;デげゲ a;ｷヴが I I;ﾐげデ ゲWW ┘ｴ┞ ｷデ ┘ﾗ┌ﾉSﾐげデ ┘ﾗヴﾆく TｴW┞げヴW ｪﾗｷﾐｪ デﾗ 
ｴ;┗W ゲﾏ;ﾉﾉWヴ デW;ﾏゲが ┘WげヴW ﾐﾗデ ｪｷ┗ｷﾐｪ デｴWﾏ ; ゲ;ﾉ;ヴ┞ I┌デが ;ﾐS ｷa ゲﾗﾏWHﾗS┞ ゲ;ｷS 
デｴW ゲ;ﾏW デﾗ ﾏWが IげS HW ﾉ;┌ｪｴｷﾐｪ ﾏWく “;ﾏW ﾏﾗﾐW┞が ﾉWゲゲ staff, less pressure, I can 
ｪWデ ﾏﾗヴW Hﾗﾐ┌ゲ ｷa デｴW デW;ﾏ Sﾗが ｪヴW;デぁ くくくデｴWヴWげゲ ; ﾉﾗデ ﾗa ゲデ┌aa デｴ;デ ┘W デ;ﾉﾆ ;Hﾗ┌デ 
┘ｴｷIｴ SﾗWゲﾐげデ ｪWデ aｷﾉデWヴWS Sﾗ┘ﾐ 
Taking on the role of Jane and Diane in the thought process, Paul and Norma granted 
the team managers influence in the discussion, playing-out a negotiation as if they 
were in the room stating their case. By inferring their potential reactions or objections 
to each idea raised, Paul and Norma sought to satisfy Jane and Diane without resort to 
formal discussions or even informal soundings on ideas. It meant that, even before 
Jane and Diane considered new proposals, attempts had been made to pre-emptively 
avoid their objections. Thus, there is an adjustment taking place prior to the 
Wﾏヮﾉﾗ┞WWゲげ ;┘;ヴWﾐWゲゲ ﾗa デｴW ヮﾗデWﾐデｷ;l changes. 
The nature of ongoing, everyday mutual adjustment at FinRec can be seen in the 
Wﾏヮﾉﾗ┞WWゲげ ;デデｷデ┌SWゲ デﾗ┘;ヴSゲ デ;ヴｪWデゲく Cﾗﾏヮ;ヴｷゲﾗﾐゲ ┘WヴW ﾏ;SW ┘ｷデｴ IﾗﾉﾉW;ｪ┌Wゲ ;ﾐS 
デ;ヴｪWデゲ ┘WヴW SWIｷSWS ┌ヮﾗﾐ けHWｴｷﾐSげ デｴW ﾗaaｷIｷ;ﾉ デ;ヴｪWデゲが ﾃ┌ゲデ ;ゲ ｷﾐSｷ┗ｷS┌;ﾉ ﾃ┌SｪWﾏWﾐデゲ 
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were made regarding quality, and these idiosyncratic, informal targets were adjusted 
accordingly. As team manager Jane explained: 
Ia ゲﾗﾏWHﾗS┞げゲ ゲ;デ デｴWヴW ;ﾐS デｴW┞げヴW Sﾗｷﾐｪ Wｷｪｴデ CVゲ ; ┘WWﾆ ;ﾐS デｴW┞げヴW 
デｴヴ;ゲｴｷﾐｪ デｴWｷヴ ぷヴW┗Wﾐ┌Wへ デ;ヴｪWデゲが Iげﾏ ﾐﾗデ ｪﾗｷﾐｪ デﾗ ﾃ┌mp up about 12 CVs. If 
ゲﾗﾏWHﾗS┞げゲ SﾗﾐW Wｷｪｴデ CVゲが デｴヴ;ゲｴｷﾐｪ デｴWｷヴ デ;ヴｪWデが ;ﾏ I ヴW;ﾉﾉ┞ ｪﾗｷﾐｪ デﾗ ﾃ┌ﾏヮ ┌ヮ 
and down about it? It, you know, it is a guide...so...announcing 12 CVs [as a 
aﾗヴﾏ;ﾉ ;Iデｷ┗ｷデ┞ デ;ヴｪWデへ ｷゲ ┘ｴ;デ ┞ﾗ┌ ゲｴﾗ┌ﾉS HW ;ゲヮｷヴｷﾐｪ デﾗ H┌デ IげS ヴ;デｴWヴ ゲWe 10 
quality ones rather than 12 naff ones put in [but] Paul would go back to the 
┗ｷW┘ デｴ;デが ゎWWﾉﾉ ｷa デｴW┞ I;ﾐ Sﾗ Wｷｪｴデ ;ﾐS デｴヴ;ゲｴ デｴWｷヴ デ;ヴｪWデゲが ┘ｴ┞ Sﾗﾐげデ デｴW┞ ｴｷデ 
ヱヲ ;ﾐS Sﾗ ; ﾉﾗデ ﾏﾗヴWいゎ WWﾉﾉが デﾗ ﾏW ｷデげゲくくくｷa ヮWﾗヮﾉW ;ヴW Sﾗｷﾐｪ Wｷｪｴデ ;ﾐS W┝IWWSｷﾐｪ 
their tarｪWデゲくくくデｴWﾐ ｷデげゲ ┌ヮ デﾗ デｴWﾏ ｷa デｴW┞ ┘;ﾐデ デﾗ ヮ┌ゲｴ デｴWﾏゲWﾉ┗Wゲ ; Hｷデ ﾏﾗヴWく 
Owner-manager Paul regularly challenges the team managers on the performance of 
certain consultants but allows scope for team managers to defend their staff with 
reasons not to dismiss them, acting out an ongoing, informal negotiation. Team 
managers then have a mediating role between discussions with Paul concerning the 
implementation of official targets and the negotiation with employees around working 
practices and the enacted, day-to-S;┞ けゲｴ;Sﾗ┘ デ;ヴｪWデゲげく Iデ ｷゲ ┘ｷデｴｷﾐ デｴｷゲ ﾏWSｷ;デｷﾐｪ 
position that further mutual adjustment can be seen to occur on an ambiguous, at 
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デｷﾏWゲ ｷﾏヮﾉｷIｷデが ﾗﾐｪﾗｷﾐｪ H;ゲｷゲく WｴｷﾉW デｴW ヴW┗Wﾐ┌W デ;ヴｪWデ ｷゲ デｴW Iﾗﾐゲ┌ﾉデ;ﾐデゲげ ヮヴｷﾐIｷヮ;ﾉ 
concern, the correlation between activity and revenue means that both measures 
receive management attention, introducing further complexity to the mutual 
adjustment of targets as guides for working practices. 
Discussion: The role of intersubjective negotiation in mutual adjustment 
Small professional service firms (sPSFs) can be characterized in terms of the degree to 
which they hold tensions between the potentially competing interests of central 
owner-managers and their valuable specialist employees, within a context of close 
physical and social proximity. This environment produces forms of mutual adjustment 
in which policies, practices and relationships are gradually, and idiosyncratically, 
developed over time through ongoing, everyday forms of both formal and informal 
negotiation. However, explicit forms of interaction and negotiation do not represent a 
full picture of mutual adjustment. To fully understand the development of working 
practices and employment relationships, we suggest the relevance of processes of 
intersubjective negotiation that underlie, and potentially undermine, mutual 
adjustment.  
The importance of intersubjectivity in small firms is derived from their particular 
ongoing, everyday interactional employment relationships in which individuals seek to 
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understand others, to make themselves understood and to hold one another 
accountable for these understandings (Reich, 2010). It is in the context of this 
unchoreographed dance of interpretation and prediction (Eden et al., 1981) that 
employment relationships and working practices adjust, adapt and accommodate 
(Schegloff, 1992). In some small firms, the gap between intersubjective perception and 
organizational realities may have limited implications but, given the ambiguity-
intensive nature of professional service work, there is greater scope for mutual 
(mis)recognition. In sPSFs there is pressure both on individual staff and the 
organizations themselves to prove their expertise, creating an environment where 
けぷHへWｷﾐｪ ヮWヴIWｷ┗WS ;ゲ ;ﾐ W┝ヮWヴデ ｷゲ ;ゲ Iヴ┌Iｷ;ﾉ ;ゲ ;Iデ┌;ﾉﾉ┞ HWｷﾐｪ ﾗﾐWげ ふAﾉ┗Wゲゲﾗn, 2011b: 
1649). This has important implications for the perception of value and the position of 
influence and power within these firms.  
Iﾐ ﾗ┌ヴ I;ゲWゲが Wﾏヮﾉﾗ┞Wヴゲげ ;ゲゲWゲゲﾏWﾐデゲ ﾗa Wﾏヮﾉﾗ┞WW ┗;ﾉ┌Wが aﾗヴ W┝;ﾏヮﾉW ｷﾐ デWヴﾏゲ ﾗa デｴW 
difficulties in replacing them, influenced their actions in attempting to keep them at 
ﾉW;ゲデ けゲ;デｷゲaｷIWSげ ふFヴｷWSﾉ;ﾐSWヴ ;ﾐS PｷIﾆﾉWが ヱΓヶΒぶく Iﾐ ;ゲゲWゲゲｷﾐｪ ┗;ﾉ┌Wが Wﾏヮﾉﾗ┞Wヴゲ ﾏ;┞ ｴ;┗W 
few objective measures against which to test their perceptions. Waiting until an 
employee leaves to identify the relative difficulties in recruiting replacement staff while 
the business struggles from a shortage of skilled staff is an unattractive option (Ram, 
1999a). Likewise, testing whether clients will take their business elsewhere should a 
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particular employee leave represents a gamble for a business relying on few clients. In 
our study, owner-managers did not acknowledge or seek to address this problem, 
confidently relying instead on their own perception of valuable expertise that had 
developed in their particular sPSF context. 
Of course, the owner-managers remained sensitive to client feedback and the 
relationships employees developed with those clients heavily influenced the 
perception of value. However, little was done to gather detailed feedback or to explore 
the quality of the relationships in any systematic way. It is therefore not only any 
けﾗHﾃWIデｷ┗Wげ ゲデ;デW ﾗa W┝デWヴﾐ;ﾉ a;Iデﾗヴゲ デｴ;デ ｷﾐaﾉ┌WﾐIWゲ デｴW SW┗WﾉﾗヮﾏWﾐデ ﾗa Wﾏヮﾉﾗ┞ﾏWﾐデ 
relationships within the firm but the perception of these factors by the relevant actors, 
in negotiation with their intersubjective assumptions of the perceptions of the parties 
they are interacting with. In our firms, the perceived value and substitutability of 
specialist employees was not simply a matter of qualifications or other objective 
measures but related to the ambiguous value attached to the somewhat intangible, 
bespoke nature of the services provided.  
While owner-managers worked in close proximity to their employees, promoting 
familiarity and opportunities for monitoring work and behaviour, the ambiguities 
around the bespoke service work often limited the extent to which these managers 
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could directly involve themselves or assess performance. As a result, several employees 
perceived as invaluable by owner-managers were observed to appear to exert influence 
over their pay and conditions. In this way, these employees could, for example, breach 
existing policies without sanction, even to the potentially longer-term detriment of the 
firm. Frequently, no explicit negotiations over the consequences of such actions were 
engaged in. Instead, negotiations seem to have often developed intersubjectively, for 
example, owner-managers weighing-up their projected alternatives, making 
;ゲゲ┌ﾏヮデｷﾗﾐゲ ;Hﾗ┌デ デｴW IﾉｷWﾐデ ﾗヴ Wﾏヮﾉﾗ┞WWゲげ HWﾉｷWaゲ ;ﾐS ｷﾐデWﾐデｷﾗﾐゲく The results of this 
process would then be interpreted by employees and both parties would adjust, adapt 
and accommodate accordingly. 
However, in responding to their interpretations and predictions, owner-managers were 
observed to offer the minimum concessions they felt sufficient. By satisficing the 
┘ﾗヴﾆWヴゲげ ヮWヴIWｷ┗WS ﾐWWSゲが デｴW デヴ;Sｷデｷﾗﾐ;ﾉﾉ┞ Sﾗﾏｷﾐ;ﾐデ ﾗ┘ﾐWヴ-manager may hope to 
remove or reduce the motivation for their employees to act as explicit negotiators. For 
example, at FinRec Paul and Norma modified ヮヴﾗヮﾗゲWS Iｴ;ﾐｪWゲ デﾗ デW;ﾏ ﾏ;ﾐ;ｪWヴゲげ 
income structure in order to make it more acceptable to the team managers and 
デｴWヴWH┞ ;┗ﾗｷS IﾗﾐaﾉｷIデ ┘ｷデｴ デｴWゲW ﾆW┞ Wﾏヮﾉﾗ┞WWゲく TｴW け;Sﾃ┌ゲデﾏWﾐデげ ┘;ゲ ﾏ;SW ﾗﾐ デｴW 
H;ゲｷゲ ﾗa P;┌ﾉ ;ﾐS Nﾗヴﾏ;げゲ HWゲデ ｪ┌Wゲゲ ;ゲ デﾗ ┘ｴ;デ Dｷ;ﾐW ;ﾐS J;ﾐe would accept. This 
intersubjective guessing game is distinct from Paul and Norma simply considering the 
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effects of management decisions on staff because their consideration was motivated by 
securing management interests through avoiding dispute rather than concern with 
J;ﾐW ;ﾐS Dｷ;ﾐWげゲ ﾗヮｷﾐｷﾗﾐゲ ヮWヴ ゲYく 
We suggest that such strategies may be particularly prominent in small firms. Where 
employment relationships are conducted in close physical proximity, explicit 
negotiations may upset familial, interpersonal relationships between interdependent 
owner-managers and employees as the raw power dynamics of the firm are laid bare 
(Goss, 1991; Ram, 1999a, 1999b), no longer obscured by the informality and 
friendliness of day-to-day collaboration (Scott et al., 1989). Further, in small PSFs 
explicitness may create greater pressure to justify ambiguity-intensive skills or outputs 
and interdependency in the employment relationship may blur the balance of power 
within the firm, leaving neither party certain of their position relative to the other. In 
such circumstances, success in an explicit negotiation may secure your interests and 
affirm your position as having power but at the expense of pleasant working relations 
and adaptive cooperation. Failure in such a negotiation, your relative weakness 




The negotiation that takes place between owner-managers and employees is therefore 
informed by their ongoing intersubjective guessing games rather than by explicit 
engagement alone. In our participant firms this led to an ad hoc, unspoken mutual 
adjustment and adaptation of working practices and employment relationships. In the 
absence of explicit negotiations, recognized by all parties wheヴW けゲデ;ﾆWゲげ I;ﾐ HW 
discussed until a mutually acceptable value is reached, the significance attached to 
various actions or comments relies heavily on mutual (mis)interpretation and 
(mis)recognition. Uncertain as to what might satisfy employees (Nadin and Cassell, 
2007), owner-managers guess, conceding something to them in the hope that they will 
at least be satisficed. While employees may therefore obtain certain concessions from 
the owner-manager, the absence of explicit negotiation means that employees may not 
recognize such concessions as benefits; the owner-ﾏ;ﾐ;ｪWヴげゲ IﾗﾐIWゲゲｷﾗﾐ ﾏ;┞ ﾐﾗデ 
therefore influence their attitudes or practices. Neither owner-manager nor employees 
see their interests as being served, however the concessional alteration may continue 
to operate. 
Any gains that are made by employees through intersubjective negotiation are informal 
and without guarantee, even if accepted as custom and practice in the firm. However, 
such informality does not preclude individuals being held accountable to the mutual 
(mis)recognition that surrounds such adaptation or adjustment. Implicit rules and 
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understandings (Brown et al., 2010) and unspoken expectations (Nadin and Cassell, 
2007) are an outcome of this intersubjectively engaged mutual adjustment process. 
This was most clearly played-ﾗ┌デ ｷﾐ デｴW ヮヴWゲWﾐデ ゲデ┌S┞ ｷﾐ デWヴﾏゲ ﾗa デｴW けゲｴ;Sﾗ┘げ 
Iﾗﾏﾏｷゲゲｷﾗﾐ ヴ;デWゲ ;デ “Iｷ‘WI ;ﾐS けゲｴ;Sﾗ┘げ デ;ヴｪWデゲ ;デ Fｷﾐ‘WIく Iﾐ Hﾗデｴ I;ゲWゲが ヮ;ヴデｷI┌ﾉ;ヴ 
expectations that were not formally or even explicitly agreed upon but developed from 
a series of assumptions and unacknowledged adaptations, undermining the formal 
policies that were in place. Thus, intersubjective negotiation arrived at provisional 
けゲｴ;Sﾗ┘ ;ｪヴWWﾏWﾐデゲげ デｴ;デ ｴ;S Iヴ┌Iｷ;ﾉ ｷﾏヮﾉｷI;デｷﾗﾐゲ aﾗヴ ヮWヴaﾗヴﾏ;ﾐIW ┘ｷデｴｷﾐ デｴWゲW aｷヴﾏゲく 
As processes of mutual adjustment, these intersubjectively negotiated guessing games 
and shadow agreements can encounter elements of dysfunction that influence the 
ﾗヴｪ;ﾐｷ┣;デｷﾗﾐげゲ SW┗WﾉﾗヮﾏWﾐデく AS;ヮデ;デｷﾗﾐゲ ﾏ;SW ﾗﾐ デｴW H;ゲｷゲ ﾗa ｪ┌Wゲゲ┘ﾗヴﾆ ﾏ;┞ ヴWケ┌ｷヴW 
company resources but still be unnecessary and unsuccessful, potentially creating 
frustrations in the employment relationship and increasing pressure on the 
organization. This matters to informal, adhocractic environments such as those in sPSFs 
because there may be few formal mechanisms effectively setting out a basis for 
decisions or more explicit, formal negotiations. Furthermore, with owner-managers in 
close proximity to employees the environment lends itself to regular, ongoing, informal 
adaptation. An intersubjective guessing game around the nature of power and 
alternatives within the organization can lead employees and employers to seek to 
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become more likeable, more in-tune with what is perceived to be required to maintain 
ﾗﾐWげゲ IﾗﾏヮWデｷデｷ┗W ;S┗;ﾐデ;ｪWく IﾐデWヴゲ┌HﾃWIデｷ┗ｷデ┞ can therefore form the basis of a mutual 
adjustment that frequently reacts or (re)negotiates, coming to underlie, and potentially 
undermine, more explicit forms of negotiation around the employment relationship. 
Currently, research into small firms, and sPSFs, is primarily concerned with explicit 
actors whose interests, the pursuit of those interests and the negotiation required for 
their achievement, can be identified (Nadin and Cassell, 2007; Ram and Edwards, 2003: 
722). We argue that explicit instances of (in)formal negotiation cannot be understood 
as discrete events disassociated from ongoing, everyday intersubjective negotiations. 
The mutually adjusting nature of employment relationships and working practices 
emerges as a result of this intersubjective negotiation as parties seek to secure their 
interests without recourse to potentially problematic explicit negotiation. These 
negotiations have important consequences for the organization as they give rise to 
potentially dysfunctional outcomes that satisfy neither owner-manager nor employee 
interests. 
Conclusion 
This paper has addressed the under-researched and under-developed concept of 
mutual adjustment in sPSFs. This is partly in response to the need for a more balanced, 
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context-sensitive understanding of the nuances of employment relationships in small 
firms (Blackburn, 2005; Harney and Dundon, 2006). We have argued that the mutual 
adjustment that develops from explicit instances of (in)formal negotiation cannot be 
understood as discrete events disassociated from ongoing, everyday intersubjective 
negotiations. We found that, frequently, there were only very limited explicit 
negotiations over the development of employment relationships or working practices.  
Iﾐ ﾐWｪﾗデｷ;デｷﾐｪが aﾗヴ W┝;ﾏヮﾉWが ;ヴﾗ┌ﾐS ;ﾐ Wﾏヮﾉﾗ┞WWげs pay, owner-managers would 
aヴWケ┌Wﾐデﾉ┞ H;ゲW デｴｷゲ ﾗﾐ デｴW Wﾏヮﾉﾗ┞WWげゲ ヮWヴIWｷ┗WS ┗;ﾉ┌W ;ﾐS ﾐﾗデ ﾗﾐ ;ﾐ┞ SｷヴWIデ 
engagement with that employee. In assessing this value, employers had few objective 
measures available and rarely attempted to find or develop them, confidently relying 
ｷﾐゲデW;S ﾗﾐ デｴWｷヴ ﾗ┘ﾐ ヮWヴIWヮデｷﾗﾐ ﾗa ┗;ﾉ┌;HﾉW W┝ヮWヴデｷゲWく TｴWヴW ﾐWWS ﾐﾗデ HW ;ﾐ┞ けヴW;ﾉげ 
┗;ﾉ┌W IﾗﾐaWヴヴWS H┞ ;ﾐ ｷﾐSｷ┗ｷS┌;ﾉげゲ ゲﾆｷﾉﾉゲ ﾗヴ ヮﾉ;IW ┘ｷデｴｷﾐ デｴW ﾗヴｪ;ﾐｷ┣;デｷﾗﾐく WW ｴ;┗W 
ゲ┌ｪｪWゲデWS デｴ;デ ｷデ ｷゲ デｴWヴWaﾗヴW ﾐﾗデ ﾗﾐﾉ┞ ;ﾐ┞ けﾗHﾃWIデｷ┗Wげ ゲデ;デW ﾗa W┝デWヴnal factors, such as 
the labour market, that influences the development of employment relationships 
within the firm but the perception of an individual or situation by those in negotiation 
with them. In this context, some employees received pay rises or other bonuses 
without seeking or expecting them. Mutual adjustment can therefore become founded 
on a largely unspoken, intersubjective guessing game. 
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We suggest that this may be particularly prominent in small firms, and ambiguity-
intensive sPSFs, where employment relationships are conducted in close physical 
proximity and explicit negotiations may expose the raw power dynamics of the firm, no 
longer obscured by the informality and friendliness of day-to-day collaboration. 
Explicitness may also create greater pressure to justify ambiguity-intensive skills or 
outputs and interdependency in the employment relationship may blur the balance of 
power within the firm, leaving neither party certain of their position relative to the 
other. In the absence of explicit nWｪﾗデｷ;デｷﾗﾐゲが ヴWIﾗｪﾐｷ┣WS H┞ ;ﾉﾉ ヮ;ヴデｷWゲ ┘ｴWヴW けゲデ;ﾆWゲげ 
can be discussed until a mutually acceptable value is reached, the significance attached 
to various actions or comments relies heavily on mutual (mis)interpretation and 
(mis)recognition. However, such informal, adhocratic development does not preclude 
individuals being held accountable to the mutual (mis)recognition that surrounds such 
adaptation or adjustment. Implicit rules and understandings and unspoken 
expectations are an outcome of this intersubjectively engaged mutual adjustment 
process. 
These findings have important implications for practitioners because they emphasise 
that everyday actions can be vested with significance and form processes of ongoing 
negotiation regardless of whether they are intended as such. Negotiations around the 
Wﾏヮﾉﾗ┞ﾏWﾐデ ヴWﾉ;デｷﾗﾐゲｴｷヮ ;ヴW ｷﾐaﾉ┌WﾐIWS H┞ ヮ;ヴデｷWゲげ ｷﾐデWヴゲ┌HﾃWIデｷ┗W ;ゲゲWゲゲﾏWﾐデ ﾗa デｴWｷヴ 
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power position relative to others in the organization and therefore their sense of how 
far their interests are satisfied or othersげ ｷﾐデWヴWゲデゲ ;IIﾗﾏﾏﾗS;デWS ｷﾐ W┗Wヴ┞S;┞ ;Iデｷﾗﾐゲく 
Potentially S┞ゲa┌ﾐIデｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ ﾗヴ ﾏ;ﾉ;S;ヮデｷ┗W けゲｴ;Sﾗ┘ ;ｪヴWWﾏWﾐデゲげ I;ﾐ デｴWヴWaﾗヴW SW┗Wﾉﾗヮ 
within firms that may undermine explicit policies and practices and become especially 
problematic as firms seek to grow and to introduce greater degrees of formality. By 
viewing mutual adjustment as informed by and informing these intersubjective 
ﾐWｪﾗデｷ;デｷﾗﾐゲが ヮ;ヴデｷWゲ デﾗ ;ﾐ ┌ﾐゲヮﾗﾆWﾐ けSW;ﾉげ ﾏｷｪｴデ ﾗﾐﾉ┞ ﾉW;ヴﾐ ﾗa デｴW H;ヴｪ;ｷﾐ デｴヴﾗ┌ｪｴ ｷデゲ 
breach, when the aggrieved party explicitly drawゲ ;デデWﾐデｷﾗﾐ デﾗ ┘ｴ;デ ｴ;S HWWﾐ け;ｪヴWWSげく 
This raises questions for practitioners about how conduct in the workplace is 
interpreted by others and how these factors influence working relationships and 
practices. It means that attempts to explicitly negotiate around an aspect of the 
employment relationship need to be understood in light of any existing implicit 
agreements that may have formed over time. Failing to consider how current practices 
ﾏ;┞ ヴWヮヴWゲWﾐデ け;ｪヴWWﾏWﾐデゲげ デﾗ ﾗﾐW ヮ;ヴデ┞ ヴｷゲﾆゲ ヮヴﾗ┗ﾗﾆｷﾐｪ ﾗヮWﾐ ;ﾐS Sｷゲruptive 
negotiation as that party seeks to explicitly assert its subjectively understood 
assessment of its bargaining power in the organization. 
There are many opportunities for future research, for example investigating how 
processes of mutual adjustment relating to specialists compare to other employees in 
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the same firms. There are interesting questions to consider regarding whether our 
findings could be extended to different types of sPSF as well as other types of SME and 
possibly larger professional organizations, together with comparative cross-cultural 
studies informed by different approaches to employee relationships. One important 
implication of our findings for researchers is the need for sensitivity to intersubjective 
forms of negotiation that may not always be recognized by research participants and 
thus may elude researchers. Explicit incidences of (in)formal negotiations should be 
understood as occurring within a context of everyday, ongoing intersubjective 
negotiation that informs mutual adjustment. We suggest that this requires a shift to 
ｪヴW;デWヴ SWヮデｴ ｷﾐ デｴW ゲデ┌S┞ ﾗa ｷﾐSｷ┗ｷS┌;ﾉゲげ ヮWヴIWヮデｷﾗﾐゲ ;ﾐS デｴW ┘;┞ゲ ｷﾐ ┘ｴｷIｴ デｴWｷヴ 
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Appendix: Table 1 





Interviews in phase two 
ComCo 
Communications 
firm based in 
Northern England, 
clients nationwide. 




Focused initially on 
local small businesses 
and local authorities 






authority work, less 
small firms work 
14 in both 
phases plus 





Initial meeting to agree 





discussions before / after 
normal working day 
5 






e-mail contact with 
(former) director 
9 
(managing director, 2x 
directors, 3x account 
manager, marketing 
manager, marketing 
assistant, design manager) 
SciRec 
Recruitment firm 
based in Eastern 
England, clients 
nationwide.  
Recruitment Specializing in 
recruitment of staff for 
science industry clients 




Initial meeting to agree 
access. Observations 




team meetings, after 









contact with owner, 
e-mail contact with 
operations manager 
and other staff 
members 
6 





based in Northern 
England, clients 
nationwide.  
Recruitment Specializing in 
recruitment of staff for 
financial services 
industry 
16 (phase one) 
12 (phase two) 
Initial meeting to agree 
access. Observations 




discussions over lunch 












contact with owner 
1* 
(former team leader) 
*informal conversations 
were held with a variety of 
team members over the 
two week on-site period, 
e.g. lunch breaks and in 
the normal course of work 
Table 1 : Summary of data collection 
